1. When it comes to grand strategy, yes, we wanted to defeat Hitler...but remember that this is *grand* strategy on a worldwide scale. Given that Churchill stated that he *knew* we would win the moment he heard that America was joining the fight against Hitler, it goes without saying that part of any grand strategy would be planning for what happens *after* Hitler was defeated...especially given that both America and the U.K. were strongly anti-communist (as I showed in the article).
Just because "defeating Hitler" was their main published aim does not by any means require that stopping the spread of communism was not also their aim.
2. Prior to 1944, the majority of Allied combat troops were not American, but British...almost all of whom were indeed hardened veterans. In other words, in 1943, the majority of the troops that would have been involved in such a landing on the northern coast of France would likely have been British. Yes, the UK could not have prevailed without us...but we often forget that we could not have prevailed without them.
3. Concerning Dieppe, it's obvious that was essentially a trial raid, a probing thrust to find out what would be needed later on a much larger scale.
4. You're quite right about the bombing campaign and its effects...but the fact remains that by 1943, we would almost certainly have had air superiority over any landing in the section of the northern coast of France directly across the Channel (thus closest to the airfields in the UK).
5. Concerning the Battle of Moscow, Hitler's generals - who knew the logistic challenge much better than he - did not want to stall the campaign for two months and shift units and supply to Army Group South. If he had not stalled the progress of Army Group Center's drive to Moscow, they would likely have been able to take the capital...though I strongly doubt this would have changed the course of the war overmuch, given that the Wehrmacht would likely have found it every bit as inhospitable as did the Grand Armee did.
6. The strongest argument I've seen against my contention was from another reader who pointed out that by invading Italy, we kept 70 divisions pinned down and unable to assist the 20-odd German divisions who tried to stop the invasion at Normandy. I really don't have a good answer to that, so I could well be wrong. I think I'm going to have to add an addendum to the article giving credit to the one who pointed that out. While I like to argue my points (as you can see above), I appreciate even more when someone proves me wrong.
